LOOKING BACK - 2018 AT AMTRAK - AN EDITORIAL COMMENT

Amtrak (the National Railroad Passenger Corporation or NRPC) struggled through another year. A new CEO, Richard Anderson, took command on January 1, 2018 after a few months sharing responsibilities with Wick Moorman during 2017. He arrived during a time when much of the passenger railroads institutional knowledge was being lost through retirements, forced or otherwise. But he brought with him a cadre of experienced associates from Delta Airlines, including a new Chief Safety Officer.

Perhaps we should not be so tough on Amtrak, given the disfunctional nature of US government generally, but here goes:

Marring 2018 was the unfortunate accident in February, when the Silver Star crashed into a parked CSX freight train in South Carolina. Killed were two Amtrak on-board employees, the engineer, and conductor. Demolition derby caused by oversized vehicles at road crossings continued during the year, and "distracted drivers" erased whatever safety gains the company made. Assumed suicides by train were almost a daily occurrance all over the country. Some improvements in the safety culture were expected after rollout of a new safety program in October.

Siemen's "Chargers" finished replacing most Oakland and Chicago state-supported commuter services during 2018. In October, Chargers finally started appearing on Surfliners in Southern California. For perhaps the first time, state commuter revenue surpassed that of the northeast corridor (or NEC), thanks mostly to California. But Amtrak financial managers, through a variety of means, continued cross-feeding revenues from state supported trains in order to mask NEC costs, where over $100 billion in unmet infrastructure needs have yet to be addressed. A new report, withheld for several years, and heavily redacted when it finally became public, indicated that much of the NEC right of way will be destroyed by effects of erosion. This will be particularly severe around Wilmington, Delaware where key shops and the national Operations Center are located. Eventually this will add up to even more unmet infrastructure needs along the shorelines of Delaware, Maryland, Connecticut, and New Jersey where NEC services operate.

Thirty of Amtrak's third generation General Electric diesels (P40/P42) were out of service at the end of the year, and 20 EMD (F59) diesel "commuter" locomotives had leases turned back . GE's 1993-1997 built (half of the fleet) locomotives are now officially antiques, or would be considered so in most states if they were automobiles. On the bright side, implementation of service for sixty-nine new Charger locomotives on state-supported services and Florida's Brightline was being completed at the end of the year. This relieved pressure somewhat on the third-gen diesel fleet, allowing 25 more of them to be shifted to the NEC to bail out troubled electrical grids. Even with more diesel help, electrical failures caused annoying irregular service interruptions on the NEC.

In June, Amtrak requested proposals for the replacement of the diesel fleet, and in December, an announcement was made that Siemens would be awarded a nearly trillion dollar contract for 75 additional new locomotives and service support package. These generation 4 diesels (and tier IV environmentally compliant) at Amtrak would begin to be delivered 2021-2025. The source of funding was not announced. Parlour Cars were taken off of the Coast Starlight, and sold at a salvage sale, along with a number of stored derelict locomotives. Discarded baggage cars and diners were also sold off at the end of the year. While Amtrak was fully using new baggage cars on long distance trains, at the same time it de-staffed most of its stations. Availability to check baggage was eliminated from most of the few remaining stations, including even Boston. The company struggled against unions and local officials when it tried to close un-needed telephone call centers and outsource others to private company vendors.

Ten years ago, the US congress arbitrarily defined state-supported commuter routes as those of 750 miles or less (excluding NEC). The same legislation required Amtrak to separate its accounting systems, and five operating units are slowly being set up. But overall financial management is still disguised and convoluted, with funds and accounting charges moving debt around without transparency. Operational monies are routnely shuffled in with infrastructure subsidies and capital budget needs. Financial documents that previously were posted on the public internet were removed.

Even though the NEC was excluded from the "commuter" definition in the 2008 legislation, NRPC made gains during 2018 in obtaining more Congressionally-mandated financial support from metropolitan transit agencies that share trackage in the northeast. While such agencies as MARC (Maryland), SEPTA (Pennsylvania), Metro North (New York-Connecticut), and MBTA (Massachusetts and Rhode Island) screamed bloody murder about their increased tolls, they generally had no choice but to comply. Unfortunately, all of the metropolitan transit agencies are as woefully underfunded as is Amtrak, but most have continuing funding sources that Amtrak does not have access to.

Amtrak management continues to thumb its nose at Congress regarding its financial performance, and over the past ten years or longer, has operated a virtual ponzi scheme with public money. While fully 3/4 of 2018 "above-the-rails" operating costs were covered by ticket sales (Amtrak says 100%), infrastructure and capital costs remain 100% or more in the red, and disguised by a variety of nefarious schemes. Amtrak managers historically have tried to hide or under report such costs, and postpone needed safety and equipment upgrades in efforts to look "profitable." They will issue a press release stating that flowers have been removed from dining car tables in order to balance out a $200 million dollar bridge repair. Federal grants and loans cover part of the shortfall, as did a better than normal annual appropriation by Congress for 2018. Publicly available monthly reports, previously posted on the public internet, were removed from view during the year. Other reports, required by Congress in 2008, were redacted, revised, or completely removed as well. This makes it harder to understand the scope of the needs in the northeast, and to keep the fingers of financial scam artists out of the cookie jars of states, metropolitan agencies, and other operating units. At the end of 2018, a revolt was brewing. Most pundits simply state that things would go a lot better for Amtrak, (and government in general) if managers would just admit, as with police, fire, education, highways, and air travel, travel by rail cannot totally fund and sustain its infrastructure and security enhancements without general revenue taxpayer support. Amtrak must achieve a balance between micromanagement by Congress and its tendency to disregard Congressional legislation and intent.

Positive train control created additional problems in 2018 for Amtrak, other transit partners, and all privately owned host freight railroads. Congress originally mandated its implementation by 2015, but has extended it seven more years, at least to 2021 under waiver. So far, only host BNSF Railway was close to implementing PTC. In other places, such as on the Union Pacific in Illinois, train speeds and safety levels are below what they were 20 years ago. Enhanced higher speed service had been promised in the St. Louis to Chicago corridor as far back as 2012, and a well-publicized test at 100+ mph took place back then, now six years in the past. Lincoln Service trains in 2018 ran an hour or more late fully one third of the time, and many days were later than that, with many dates cancelled altogether. Worse performance than in 1940, when steam engines plied the corridor. Over $2 billion in economic stimulus funds spent over a ten year period with no tangible results. Promised timetable improvements on the Wolverine route in Michigan also failed to occur during 2018, nor had the new locomotives sitting in Chicago been inaugurated there.

Aside from BNSF, Amtrak's other 19 host partners had not yet fully implemented positive train control by the end of the year. At one point, the NRPC's Anderson threatened to end all passenger train service nationwide. Risk managers concluded that the easiest way to avoid risk was to shut the doors and go out of business, a rampant theory these days in both government and the private sector. Out west, a particular example was the Southwest Chief, one of the transcontinental routes between Chicago and the Pacific coast. BNSF, which hosts the train on most of its route, said it was not interested in maintaining trackage used by the Chief in New Mexico, Colorado, and Kansas. It was prepared to allow it to be downgraded to 45 mph or slower. A consortium of state agencies and local governments stepped in during the year to fund its continuance, and in December the Federal Railroad Administration announced a grant to pay for installation of positive train control.


Sadly, postitive train control seems to be a placebo, technically inadequate, and largely a waste of money. Improved crossing safety, driver education, and an enhanced safety culture would have done more good. A final report released by the National Transporation Safety Board regarding a 2011 Amtrak vs. truck accident in Nevada, shows reliance on positive train control to be largely misplaced. That report blamed the accident on a combination of a poorly maintained truck, trucking company employer oversight lapses, a possibly distracted or over-medicated driver with a hideous driving record, and on the systemic failure of state commercial driver data-bases to communicate with, interact with, and to comply with, federal DOT driver requirements. Had positive train control been in effect in Nevada, it would have had no bearing on either that accident, or any other road crossing incursion that afflicted railroads during 2018. However, PTC likely would have prevented the February wreck in South Carolina which involved two trains.

Be that as it may, Amtrak was said to have fully implemented I-ETMS on most of its diesel locomotives by the end of 2018. This "Interoperable Train Management System" is the third generation of GPS-based train tracking, integrated with wayside signals, and the on board equipment, in this case outsourced from Wabtec Corporation after previous systems from other vendors failed. Diesel locomotives at Amtrak are now said to be ready when host railroads are. This is at least the third system Amtrak has tried, each costing the company hundreds of millions of dollars that could have been better used elsewhere. [Admittedly, the latest electronic gadgetry has a limited shelf life, whether in railroading or any other business.] Amtrak maintains its own (incompatible) system on the NEC, and has yet another incompatible system on its trackage in Michigan. Locomotives used in those locations must presumably still have two different systems in order to interchange between various routes (although I-ETMS may eventually be able to compensate for that).

In the southeast, Amtrak refused to move to Miami's new Central Station, or to serve Miami International Airport after local governments and the Florida East Coast Railway invested heavily. New tracks that were built for Amtrak at those stations are already rusting and deteriorating, and the Amtrak portion of the station is unused. Meantime, new privately owned and operated "Virgin-Brightline" service ramped up in the Ft. Lauderdale to Miami market, and was poised to take over Tampa-Orlando service with additional extensions. It appeared that Amtrak would be shortly abandoning south Florida, just as it did in 2006 when it pulled out of the northern portion of the state. Any hope of restoring services between New Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, Tallahassee, and Orlando were scuttled when CSX downgraded its trackage and spun it off to a short line operator. But on a more positive note, agreements were being made with Texas Central, the new high-speed Houston-Dallas operator, to interchange with their coming high speed services in Dallas and Fort Worth. An extension of the Heartland Flyer northward from Oklahoma City into Kansas, to connect with the Southwest Chief, was still on many people's wish list.

In the midwest, Amtrak reduced its two-unit Wolverine and Lincoln Service commuter trains to just one locomotive each in order to save costs. Rumors were circulating that Capitol Limited and/or Lakeshore Limited trains would be re-routed through Detroit in the future, due to freight congestion on host railroads. This would leave northern Indiana unserved. Work continued under auspices of the State of Michigan, on upgrading more trackage purchased by the state for the Wolverine service, now giving more control of this route to Amtrak dispatchers. Positive improvements were taking place in the Chicago area, which had direct benefits for passenger rail. The CREATE program and the Indiana Gateway project were making strides in chipping away some of the delays that passenger and freight trains alike incur in crossing other railroad lines and highways at grade level.

Also during 2018, more food service cuts were made by Amtrak's new CEO, and elimination of special charter trains occurred. Private car moves on Amtrak trains were severly curtailed, causing the cancellation of the annual convention of AAPRCO, the Association of Private Car Owners. New dining cars were received from a vendor, some 6 years late, but according to most reports, were being parked rather than being placed into service. Brand new food service preparation equipment was being stripped out and sold for salvage. While Amtrak was finally able to retire the last of its 60-year old "heritage" era cars, service did not improve, and actually receded from prior year levels. Still pending at the vendor at the end of the year were crew dormitory cars, which if they had been delivered on time, would have added millions of dollars in additional revenues to the company's bottom line in 2018. Without crew dormitory cars, from 10-14 sleeping car rooms are taken up on each an every overnight train by Amtrak employees. While an additional car on each train might add some overall fuel and other expense costs, the potential revenue generation of $10,000+ per trip would surely have justified their use.

Another change for 2018 was the increased use of proactive train cancellations in advance of expected weather impacts affecting host railroads. Debate on this issue raged during the year, and one can certainly understand both points of view. Other cancellations during the year seemed mostly managable, due to western fires and landslides, freight train derailments, tunnel collapse dangers, and other environmental reaons. Trackwork delays were significant in many areas, particularly on the Union Pacific host in Illinois for the tenth straight year with no operational improvements yet resulting. Delays for non-railroad related nearby police actions seemed to be annoyingly increased over previous years.

P42's clearly comprised a shrinking transition fleet at the end of 2018. Neither the Northeast Corridor, its extensions, or the remaining "national system" can operate without reliable diesel road locomotives and switchers. Major procurement processes were underway for new diesel locomotives and for NEC "Acela replacements," after being delayed 10 years by the former Joseph Boardman administration. Yet no progress had been made on updating rolling stock outside of state-supported routes, where Siemens took over a commuter coach order which had gone into default under the administration of Boardman's previously selected vendor. Looking ahead, it is clear that one of the next major hurdles to overcome will be the purchase and/or updates of Superliner equipment in the west, and Amfleet equipment in the east. Other major hurdles, of course, will be figuring out a way to replace bridges, tunnels, electrical substations, and caternary on the NEC, without charging those costs to the Empire Builder in Montana, or any other stalking horse for the true destination of that money. Audit findings continue to be ignored and discarded, and strange things continue to happen, like Hialeah, Florida's station being charged for snow removal costs. Western trains are still being docked for equipment depreciation on now-scrapped 60-year old equipment that no longer exists, and never saw a single day of use west of Chicago. Western trains are still being docked, and services downgraded, so that New York City can upgrade the Farley post office building.

The Amtrak national organization itself, was a company designed from its 1971 outset to gradually go out of business. Yet each year, as long as it maintains the illusion of providing nationwide service, it seems to find enough political support to keep a bare bones "above the rail" operation going. As 2019 breaks the horizon, the only remaining question today is how much more life there will be for that illusion at Amtrak, for its aging equipment, and whether political supporters will have the gumption to address one hundred billion dollars in unmet infrastructure needs in the northeast alone.

Will an Eisenhower-era "interstate highway system" approach work for passenger trains when 95% of the network operates over privately owned rails, and only 5% of the government-owned trackage comprises the "800 pound gorilla in the room that eats 100% of the banannas?" Is there some other approach that might work, when after all, passenger rail continues to be the most sustainable overall form of transit, the most environmentally friendly, and potentially the fastest mode?












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